Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field
Roger C. Park∗

PART I
Several commentators have suggested that standards governing
admission of scientific evidence should be different in criminal and
civil cases and that the prosecution in criminal cases should be held
to a higher standard than the defense because the prosecution has a
1
higher burden of proof. I prefer to see reasonable doubt as a
2
sufficiency standard that has no impact at the admissibility stage.
The reasonable doubt standard should be applied by the trier at the
end of the trial, when all the evidence is in.
The reasonable doubt standard reflects dual goals: first to acquit
if the doubt is reasonable; second to convict if the doubt is fanciful.
Both goals are dealt with in the typical instruction stating that a
reasonable doubt is not any possible doubt or a doubt based on
speculation, but that it has to be the type of doubt that would cause a
juror to hesitate in making an important decision in the juror’s own
∗
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When cases are close to the line drawn by the burden of proof,
as is true of many if not most cases that go to trial, then there is no
reason to think that evidence that is given exaggerated importance
will lead to the wrong result more often when it is offered by the
prosecution than when offered by the defense. In cases in which
dubious expert testimony is available to one side or the other, is the
prosecution systematically short of the proof line (so that the dubious
testimony might illicitly push the case over the line) or systematically
beyond the proof line (so that the dubious testimony might illicitly
push the case back)? This is an empirical question for which
abstractions about reasonable doubt offer no help.
Thinking that dubious evidence does less harm when it helps the
defense than when it helps the prosecution is enticing because
acquitting a guilty person is better than convicting an innocent one.
But that is not the correct way to frame the issue. When the case is
near the proof line, an error on the side of the defense would mean
acquitting someone who had just barely been proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and an error on the side of the prosecution would
mean convicting someone who has almost but not quite been proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Both errors are equally bad.
To illustrate, suppose that the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is satisfied when twenty guilty people are acquitted
for every one innocent person convicted. (If readers do not like the
20-1 ratio, they are invited to substitute their own; the principle is the
same.) If so, letting twenty-one guilty people go free for every
innocent person convicted is just as bad an error as letting only
nineteen guilty go free for every innocent convicted. To say that the
first error is less serious is to argue for an elevation of the standard, so
that twenty-one guilty are set free for every innocent convicted.
Reiteration of this reasoning process would lead to imposing an
infinite burden of proof on the prosecution.
PART II
I share Professor Friedman’s hope that better testimony about
the limits of forensic science testimony, accompanied by thoughtful
instructions, will lead to better results. If particular evidence was
admissible when initially offered by the defense, but not when
initially offered by the prosecution, that tilt would enhance the
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difficulty of assessing the probative value of the testimony and
explaining its limits.
If a “mercy rule” were applied to a certain type of forensic
evidence, call it Test X, then the defense would be the master of
whether results of the test were admitted. Even if the prosecution
had incriminating evidence based on the test, the defense would have
the choice not to open the door when the defense learned of it on
discovery. If the prosecution had no Test X evidence or if the
defense thought that dueling experts might increase the chance of
acquittal, then the defense could privately go to a Test X expert and
get her opinion. If the results were unfavorable to the defense, the
defense could either drop the inquiry or look for a more malleable
expert. The result would be that the jury would never hear anything
about Test X unless the defense got a favorable result. The
asymmetric approach would create a nonblind research program in
which the principal investigator would report only results that
confirmed his hypothesis, and the forum would not publish results
unfavorable to the hypothesis except in direct rebuttal of a finding by
one of the proponents.
There are many problems with prosecution forensic evidence,
but in one respect it starts from a better footing than defense
evidence. There is often more than one suspect to be tested.
Therefore, the researcher, even if biased toward the state, has more
of an incentive to be objective.
Under an asymmetric regime, there would obviously have to be
some degree of reciprocity, so that certain proffers by the defendant
would open the door to prosecution evidence of a similar nature. If
the defense offers evidence that the defendant passed Test X, then
the prosecution ought to be allowed to offer evidence that the
defendant failed Text X when administered by the prosecution.
What would the boundaries of an asymmetric approach be? If the
defense passed a defense polygraph test and the prosecution
witnesses passed a prosecution polygraph test, would the prosecution
be barred from putting in this evidence? Or would the prosecution
be permitted to put in the same kind of dubious evidence as the
defense, and only be barred from offering different evidence of equal
dubiousness? These are vexing questions that would not need to be
answered under a symmetric approach.
Under an asymmetric approach, exactly what types of forensic
science evidence might be admissible on behalf of the defendant, but
not on behalf of the prosecution? In email correspondence with me,
Professor Friedman indicated that one example would be polygraph
tests.
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Before discussing the polygraph example, I would like to note
my agreement with Professor Friedman that there ought to be
definitive precedent on the admissibility of forensic tests. The
Supreme Court is wrong if it means otherwise in its repeated
language about trial court discretion over the admission of expert
4
testimony. Identical forensic testimony should not be admissible in
one courtroom but inadmissible next door. I also agree with
Professors Denbeaux and Risinger that the precedent should be task5
specific, and therefore believe that different islands of precedent
should apply to the guilty knowledge test as opposed to the control
question test, or to findings of deceit as opposed to findings of no
deceit. Suppose, then, that the judge is convinced that the control
question polygraph test, when used to show lack of deceit, is likely to
mislead the jury. Perhaps the judge believes that the test has some
value, that it somewhat increases the chance that the subject was not
deceitful, but that the jury is likely to give the test many times its true
value. Suppose also that presenting testimony to tutor the jury on the
true value of the test would be expensive and mainly futile. Should
polygraph evidence then be admissible if offered by the defendant,
but not if offered by the prosecution? It shares the problems of “Test
X.”
There are other reasons to be dubious about freely admitting
polygraph tests offered by the defense. Much of the existing research
about the effectiveness of polygraph testing has been performed on
subjects who are naive about countermeasures. These studies would
not be generalizable to actual use at trial if the polygraph became a
routine part of the defense arsenal. A judge can exclude this
evidence if, as seems probable, training in countermeasures can
defeat or seriously impair the effectiveness of the test in detecting
6
deceit. The admission of polygraph tests could also exaggerate the
advantage possessed by wealthy defendants. They are in the best
position to employ malleable but convincing polygraphers, and to
7
find and benefit from expert tutoring in countermeasures.
4
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7
Another problem is that the defendant has a right not to testify, and the
prosecution cannot comment on the exercise of that right. Surely the defendant
should not be allowed to exercise that right while also putting in the expert
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Another danger is that jurors will draw negative inferences from
the absence of evidence. If jurors learn that polygraph tests are
admissible, they might draw inferences against defendants who do
not present the evidence, or against the prosecution for not
presenting it. To assist in assessing probative value, will the judge
instruct that one defendant could afford the test but the other
couldn’t? Will he try to explain to the jury why the nontested
defendant didn’t go to the prosecution for the test? What would the
instruction be if the co-defendant who didn’t present polygraph
evidence had gone to the police for the test, but flunked the policeadministered test?
An asymmetrical approach toward expert testimony would also
harm the reputation of the courts, because it is the type of rule likely
to be understood only by lawyers. Imagine the clinician prepared to
testify about rape trauma syndrome. She would look dimly on the
legal system were she told that she could testify for a defendant in
one courtroom in support of the defense contention that the victim
was not raped because she displayed no signs of rape trauma, whereas
in the next courtroom she could not testify for the prosecution in
support of the contention that the existence of rape trauma
symptoms increases the probability that a different victim was raped.
I do not deny that there are some instances in which one can
justify treating criminal cases differently than civil cases for purposes
of evidence rules. For example, it is justified where exclusion is
necessary to prevent or deter abuse of governmental power, as might
occur were the fruits of illegal confessions admissible or the
defendant’s confrontation right abolished. Where the purpose of the
rule is to prevent inferential error, however, then an even-handed
approach is the better one.
PART III
Professor Nance has argued, in his paper for this symposium,
that courts should consider whether experts are repeat players when
deciding whether to admit suppositional science because exclusion
can have ex ante benefits by causing repeat players to do more
research and produce better science. Professor Imwinkelried’s
critique of that paper questions the foundation for this requirement
testimony of a polygrapher saying that he was not deceitful when he denied
committing the crime. That would deprive the prosecution of cross-examination and
encourage the strategic substitution of inferior evidence. Even the leading propolygraph case of United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (en
banc), would not admit the test unless the person found to be deceitful or
nondeceitful testified.
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in the text or history of the rules, and also queries its administrability.
Regardless of who is right, the concept does not seem to do much to
differentiate the prosecution expert and the defense expert in the
area of forensic science. The handwriting analyst, polygrapher or
ballistics expert who testifies for the defense is just as likely to be a
repeat player as a prosecution witness. Indeed, the prosecution
witnesses who hone their skills by working full time in a police lab
might be encouraged to do more research and make their fields
more scientific if they knew that failing to do so would not only
diminish their usefulness to the prosecution, but would also shut off a
second career as a defense expert.
PART IV
I have commented on one procedural advantage provided to the
defendant: the reasonable doubt rule. Another advantage is that the
trial judge cannot direct a verdict against a criminal defendant, nor
grant the prosecution a new trial if the defendant is acquitted.
Arguably, judges therefore need to be vigilant in excluding defense
evidence that might be given exaggerated importance and lead to a
fanciful doubt. David McCord argues that this imbalance is one
reason why courts are stricter with defense evidence that blames
alternative perpetrators by showing that other people had a motive to
commit the crime than with prosecution evidence that shows
8
defendant had a motive. The same argument could be made in
support of the position that judges should actually be stricter with
defense forensic science evidence than with prosecution evidence.
Ultimately, arguments from procedural advantages provided to
the defendant always cut both ways. It can be argued that the
advantage reflects a value judgment in favor of the defendant, and
that value judgment means that courts should be liberal in admitting
defense expert testimony. Or it can be argued that the advantage tilts
the field too far in favor of the defendant, and that to offset it or
prevent its overexploitation, courts should be cautious in admitting
dubious defense expert testimony.
PART V
Professor Friedman cites several evidence rules as examples of
asymmetric admissibility rules. I think that these rules have a quite
different basis. They are either not asymmetric at all or asymmetric
8

David McCord, “But Perry Mason Made it Look So Easy:” The Admissibility of
Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 917, 925-26 (1996).
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in very weak sense.
I will begin with a rule that, admittedly, is usually believed to be
asymmetric. That is the so-called “mercy rule,” the rule that allows a
criminal defendant to call character witnesses attesting to his good
character.
The prosecution cannot call witnesses attesting to
defendant’s bad character until the defendant has opened the door
9
in this fashion.
I think this rule can be fully explained by differences in
probative value. Defense character evidence has greater probative
value than prosecution character evidence because the prosecution
has potent ways to fight back when the defense offers character
evidence. The prosecution can not only introduce reputation and
opinion testimony, but can also ask the character witness questions
about any pertinent bad conduct in the defendant’s life, whether or
not it resulted in conviction. It can even ask about arrests that did
not lead to charges. Thus, a defendant is unlikely to initiate the
inquiry unless his life can bear this sort of examination. So when the
defense offers the evidence, it is evidence of an unblemished life,
whereas if the prosecution offered it, it would only be evidence of a
particular reputation or opinion. If given the opportunity to initiate
the character inquiry, the prosecution could introduce character
evidence without fear of effective specific-acts rebuttal (impeachment
of the witnesses by asking about defendant’s good deeds does not
have the same bite). The defense is deterred from presenting
character evidence except when it is most probative, whereas
prosecution-initiated character evidence would have no such
constraints.
If I am wrong, and Rule 404 is truly asymmetric, then the most
probable explanation is that defense character evidence helps the
powerful and well-connected, and hence is more popular with
rulemakers than other pro-defense evidence. If so, I do not think
that it is a model that ought to be copied.
Rule 609(a)(2), another rule cited by Professor Friedman as
asymmetric, is even easier to explain as a straight distinction based on
prejudice and probative value. This is the rule about the admissibility
of prior convictions to impeach. In effect, it tells judges to give more
protection to criminal defendants than to other witnesses in
balancing prejudice against probative value. This rule makes sense,
not as a break for criminal defendants, but simply because the
evidence is less probative and more prejudicial when offered against
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a criminal defendant than when offered against other witnesses.
First, against the witness who is a criminal defendant, the jury might
use the evidence for more than its permitted purpose of
undermining the witness’s credibility. Second, the probative value of
the evidence is less because the situational pressure on a guilty
defendant to lie is so great that his prior character for lying hardly
tells us anything about the probability that he will lie to get out of a
serious criminal accusation. As Professor Friedman has stated in
another article:
If I am right that character impeachment
evidence of a criminal defendant is always, or almost
always, more prejudicial than probative and that
sometimes character evidence impeaching a
prosecution witness may be more probative than
prejudicial, then this asymmetry does make sense; it
simply responds to different situations with different
results, each promoting the truth-determining
process. Indeed, in some situations, an asymmetrical
evidentiary rule may be considered corrective of an
asymmetry inherent in the situation. The accused is
simply in a different situation from any other potential
witness—for either the prosecution or the defense—in
a criminal case. (Note in this connection that I do not
argue that there should be a per se rule against
character impeachment evidence of defense
10
witnesses.)
Professor Friedman also cites Rule 412 as an asymmetrical
evidence rule. Apparently Rule 412 is on the list because it prevents
the admission of an alleged victim’s sexual history to show that she is
promiscuous, while the defendant’s prior sexual crimes are
admissible to show that he is a rapist. Unlike the other examples, if it
is asymmetric it is a pro-prosecution asymmetry. One can certainly
argue, however, even from the pure accuracy point of view, that the
rule is not asymmetrical because the probative value of prior serious
sex crimes by the defendant is greater than the probative value of
11
ordinary sexual activity by the victim. At any rate, the rule is a rather
weak pillar in support of the proposition that values behind the
reasonable doubt rule require greater permissiveness for defense
10
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evidence; the more obvious and compelling thought is that if the rule
is relevant to the issue at all, it cuts the other way.
Rules 803(8)(B) and (C) round out Professor Friedman’s list of
asymmetric rules. Whether the first of these, 803(8)(B), treats the
prosecution and defense differently in any way is not at all clear. It
literally provides that police records are not admissible when offered
12
by either side in a criminal case. It is true, however, that some cases
treat the rule’s apparent ban as a drafting error, and state that the
13
records may be received when offered by the defense.
Even if 803(8)(B) allows the defense but not the prosecution to
use the evidence, it is questionable whether the rule is really
asymmetric when considered against the background of other
evidence rules. Under the hearsay rules considered as a whole, the
prosecution would not be able to put in its own adversarially
prepared records, but the defense could use the prosecution’s
adversarially prepared records against the prosecution under the
non-literal interpretation of FRE 803(8)(B). Similarly, the defense
could not put in the defendant’s adversarially prepared records, even
though the prosecution could use those records against the
defendant under the admissions rule. Either side could use its own
routine business records.
The system of rules is broadly
14
symmetrical.
Under the explicit language of Rule 803(8)(C), the defense can
use factual findings made by the government resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to law, absent an indication of lack of
trustworthiness, but the government cannot use those findings
against the defense in a criminal case. Again, this does not favor the
defense as much as it seems to when considered against the
background of other evidence rules. Findings by the government can
be used against the government but not for it. Findings by the
defense can be used against the defense but not for it. To illustrate,
12

For years I thought this was a drafting oversight, and as a member of the
Minnesota Advisory Committee, I made a presentation to the rule-making body, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, on behalf of the Advisory Committee’s proposed revision
of the rule to correct this perceived error. The revised rule would have explicitly
provided that 804(8)(B) evidence was admissible when offered by the defense, but
not when offered by the prosecution. A prosecutor stood up and said that police
reports often contained unreliable information and shouldn’t be admissible against
the prosecution. Apparently the Court found her argument more persuasive than
mine, because it did not accept the proposed revision.
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suppose that a white-collar defendant offers in evidence the results of
an internal investigation in which the defendant’s investigator made
findings of fact with an eye toward litigation. The defendant could
15
not use that self-serving investigation, but the government could use
it as the admission of an agent, and the fact that it contains opinion
and second-hand knowledge would be no obstacle. The symmetry is
not perfect, however, because sometimes the defense investigation
would find shelter under the attorney-client privilege, while it is less
likely to do so in the case of a prosecution investigation. On the
other hand, in some ways the rules governing out-of-court admissions
are asymmetric against the defendant because some courts hold that
statements by public agents are not admissible under the exemption
16
for agency admissions.
The most clearly asymmetric evidence rule is Rule 804(b)(3),
the statement against interest exception. In its present form (an
amendment is pending but not assured), the final sentence of this
rule provides that “[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
17
trustworthiness of the statement.” This rule, which is asymmetric
against the defendant, reflects the time-honored suspicion of
testimony offered on behalf of the defendant that unavailable third
parties confessed to the crime. There is a fear that a naive juror
would find fabricated confessions to raise a reasonable doubt when
they did not, and that the results would be irremediable because the
prosecution could not have a new trial. The same fear could be used
to argue, not that defendants should be freely allowed to offer
suppositious expert testimony, but that the trustworthiness of the
testimony should be clear when it is offered to exculpate a criminal
defendant.

15

See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 110-16 (1943); see also FED. R. EVID.
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(defendant railroad’s investigation records admissible in civil case).
16
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EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO AMERICAN TRIALS 258-59 (1998), and cases cited therein.
Another evidence rule cited by Professor Friedman, Rule 301, is asymmetric but is
not a rule governing the admission or exclusion of evidence. It simply protects the
presumption of evidence by limiting the rule that presumptions shift the burden of
production to civil cases.
17
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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PART VI
The issue discussed here requires resolution of the value
question of what level of proof should be required to convict and the
empirical question of whether a looser attitude toward defense expert
testimony will help achieve convictions when the proof is sufficient
and acquittals when it is not. My own guess is that having different
standards of proof for experts will not help achieve the goal. The
American system of tendentious paid experts is of dubious help even
when the experts testify about valid areas of expertise. When the
field itself is weak, courts should use the same standard for defense
and prosecution and forbid both to offer the testimony. That is also
the simpler solution, leading to less complex precedent, and the
solution more intuitively appealing to criminal justice consumers.
When a procedural change increases the number of guilty
defendants who go free, there is a danger that new measures will
appear to counteract that change. If the playing field tilts to the
defendant in terms of evidence advantages at trial, that tilt might be
balanced out by increases in punishment without trial. Punishment
without trial can be achieved in many ways, including tolerance of
police brutality, increases in penalties that give the prosecution more
leverage in inducing guilty pleas, civil commitment of persons alleged
to be dangerous, or even by executive declaration that the country is
at war and that enemies of society, therefore, may be held without
trial. We should be wary of remedies that might reduce false positives
by increasing false negatives, while looking for reforms that will
reduce both.
It is possible to reduce both, or at least to decrease false positives
without increasing false negatives. Improving lineups, for example by
using sequential blind lineups, could well reduce the risk of false
positives without increasing false negatives.
Mandatory tape
recording of police interrogations might decrease both false positives
and false negatives.
Establishing independent crime labs, as
18
advocated by Professor Giannelli, is a third possibility. Those are
the sorts of evidentiary reforms we ought to be advocating for in the
criminal justice system.
There are other political dangers. Once a formal separation of
civil and criminal cases is made, those who are interested in
loosening the requirements for prosecution evidence have the
chance to tinker with the criminal rules. Keeping the two together is

18
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more likely to promote fairness in screening expert testimony. Those
who fear that the prosecution will get away with admitting junk
science ought to be happy to ride on the coattails of the large
manufacturers who lobby for tort reform in civil cases.
AFTERTHOUGHT
I see that I have fallen prey to the law professor’s temptation to
argue, and have not noted the many points at which I found useful
insights in Professor Friedman’s draft, or at which I agreed with him.
I can only ask the reader to bear in mind that my misgivings are
limited and that I admire Professor Friedman’s contribution.

